The Northern Territory—South Australian 'White Elephant'/Commonwealth Prize: Perception and Reality in the Federation Era

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Cynthia Atherton is a Darwin resident studying for a B.A. in economic history as an external student with the University of New England. This monograph is a slightly edited version of a very highly commended paper Cynthia presented during 1989 in the course of her studies at the University. It deals with the period of Territory history shortly before the time of Federation until the Commonwealth takeover in 1911.

Whilst the hand-over from South Australia to Commonwealth control is a very well-known fact, the various machinations and manoeuvrings which preceded this event are hardly known at all to the average Territorian, though these provide a fascinating study of the workings of human nature, politics and greed. It is this little-known though terribly important aspect of Territory history that Cynthia focuses on, and she reveals for us the complex nature of a seemingly simple and apparently preordained event.

A copy of the complete, unedited paper is held by the State Library of the Northern Territory.
In place of one guardian there are now six, and to me there seems every ground for indulging in the hope that the progress of this Territory will be faster and more certain under these new conditions.
Mr Justice Mitchell, Palmerston, 2 January 1911.

The Government Resident of the Northern Territory thus revealed his perception of the new Australian Commonwealth as 'six guardians' when he welcomed the Territory's transfer from South Australian to federal control. He voiced the hopes of some 3000 Territorians, the non-Aboriginal population, of whom 905 were adult Europeans, in 1911. It may reasonably be assumed that Aboriginal opinion bordered on indifference to this adjustment to white minority rule; and that the large Asian community had misgivings due to recent experience of discriminatory Commonwealth legislation.

Why was transfer to the Commonwealth welcomed? The forty-eight years, since annexation to South Australian control in 1863, had brought disappointing growth and development to Australia's remotest north, especially when compared with northern Queensland, of comparable size and climatic conditions. The most obvious physical difference lay in the degree of sea access, the coastline of Queensland serving that state rather better. The land mass acquired by South Australia had a convoluted northern coastline almost 2000 kilometres long, but with seas 'shallow, reef-strewn, an opaque milky-green ripped by savage tides'. This edged the narrow northern margin of the long rectangle of some 1.35 million square kilometres which stretched to join South Australia's dry north 1600 kilometres away.

Two hostile and difficult climates rule in this vast empty land. The arid continental zone reaches from the border at 26°S over the MacDonnell Ranges' peak of 1510 metres at Mt Ziel and stretches north across the Barkly Tableland to merge at about 17°S with the monsoonal region of the Top End. Here in the tropical heat rain averages 1500 millimetres yearly between December and April; and so here are found the four major rivers of the Territory: the Victoria, Daly, Alligator and Roper, each shallow but big enough to survive the six or seven months of total drought, the Dry Season. Water, determining the nature of vegetation, is always precious in the Northern Territory; a sparse 200 millimetres a year is all that the Centre receives, mostly in winter, and only in the Top End Wet Season is water normally abundant.

At once the problems for South Australia became apparent. The isolating distances, high temperatures and lack of water made the passage of people, stock and goods arduous and costly and communications extremely slow; and, with nineteenth-century technology, frustrated plans for settlement and for the agriculture needed for food production and cash-crops. Export earnings on which development could build and capital works expand failed to materialise as pastoralism, mining and other smaller ventures returned little or collapsed. By 1901, the

Northern Territory’s debt to South Australia had reached £2,114,205 ($4,228,410) and was growing annually with the cost of borrowings for the few government improvements and of essential administration. The Northern Territory had fulfilled the earlier doubts of South Australians, revealed when WJ Sowden wrote of it in 1882 as

_that extreme northern country of ours, which we have called by courtesy the Northern Territory, but too often, with bitterness, our white elephant._

Why, then, when the Northern Territory project had clearly failed, was the transfer process to the new and receptive Commonwealth frustrated for ten more years, until 1911? There is some evidence of considerable pride in Adelaide in the possession of its own colony which made it reluctant to admit defeat, and certainly a long-held obsession with landownership as the route to social upliftment. However, it seems probable that confused economic perception was largely responsible, that dominating the motives and attitudes of leading South Australians concerned with this puzzling episode was a strongly misjudged belief in the inevitability of Territory economic success. It drove both public and private sectors, despite all the evidence and experience to the contrary, during almost fifty years of Territory dealings. This belief was still powerful enough in the 1900s to fuel active opposition to the Commonwealth transfer for another ten years. The fear of missing some great coup, assured if only they could hold on long enough, gripped influential elements in Adelaide society; it thus swayed essential political decisions, despite the worsening economic position which forced a ministerial admission by WJ Denny in 1910 that South Australia’s administration ‘had been a hideous failure’.

There is a considerable volume of contemporary evidence which reveals the extent of South Australia’s nineteenth-century misperception of Northern Territory conditions and difficulties, of its productive potential and economic promise, thereby giving insights into the delusions of the period. From today’s standpoint, with today’s advantages in scientific research and the lessons from twentieth-century failures, the fallacies and hopelessness of those aspirations become obvious. But blinded then by ambition and stubborn beliefs that masked the harsh truth, the leading South Australians, those ‘most progressive’ leaders and the ‘moneyed men of the State’, were ready victims of the economic misperceptions that drove them.

It is said, ‘History [is] about producing a model that works’; such a model demands a certain contextual understanding at the start. To achieve this, it is necessary to look back to 1895, the year of South Australia’s first public questioning of its Northern Territory policies.

The Northern Territory Royal Commission opened in Adelaide in January 1895, with a mandate to inquire into ‘all matters relating to the Northern Territory, further development of

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2. WJ Sowden, _The Northern Territory as It Is_, Adelaide, 1882, p.3.
3. SAPD, 10.8.1910, p281.
its resources and its better government'. Appointed by the progressive Liberal government of Premier CC Kingston in the second year of an unprecedented six-year term, it reported after six hectic months. In this time, members had gathered evidence from seventy-nine witnesses, had visited Mackay and elsewhere in Queensland (for first-hand tropical experience, since overlanding to Palmerston, as Darwin was then named, was too slow and difficult) and had inspected Queensland’s sugar and meat industries and its ‘alien’ workers. The Commission had circulated questionnaires in the Northern Territory and questioned ex-pastoralists now in the south.

The Commission evidence revealed the Northern Territory experience, ethos and folklore. Causes and remedies suggested for Territory ills ranged over a wide field born of the diversity of the witnesses. Near-total failure of attempted agriculture was attributed mainly to unsuitable land, shortage of capital and labour and to incompetence, with no mention of pests, climate, drought or costs. Employment of Chinese in Territory ventures was blamed for the failure of Territory economic development, together with continual speculation in land, insufficient capital and mismanagement in all enterprises. In particular, the ‘absence of a bold and vigorous government policy’ of administration was regretted. The pastoral industry was seen as needing most help, with some for mining, certain research and development initiatives for agriculture and a north-south transcontinental railway joining Palmerston with Adelaide to stimulate settlement and production, built on the land-grant system.

The Commissioners - three Conservative members, two Liberals, one Labor and an Independent as Chairman - were split by ideology over the major issues of ‘coloured’ labour in the Territory goldmines, the north–south rail link (Oodnadatta–Pine Creek), the need for an experimental farm for agricultural products, the suggested aid for a horse-breeding program for the Indian Government, and the adequacy of proposed loans for meatworks and for deep mining. Members were all agreed that the Chinese should be outlawed from mining; that well-sinking, new stock-routes and more liberal land laws would help pastoralists, as would essential tick-fever disease ('redwater') research and access to markets in Western Australia; that an agricultural expert should assess Territory potential and map its fertile arable land; and that, when needed, government sugar mills should be built, as in Queensland. Finally, all concerned proclaimed their faith in the Territory's future prosperity. One witness, John Costello, was moved to affirm:

*I have this faith; that a time of glowing prosperity is in store for it, that the future will bring for it a measure of success counterbalancing its many failures and its long series of disasters in the past...the same bold enterprising spirit that marked the old pioneer will be found in the younger generation - heroic endeavour, great heart, whole valour...and everlasting hope.*

This is remarkable from a failed cattleman, who by 1895 was ruined by the combined hazards of climatic and Aboriginal depredations, disease and poor markets.
Is this a manifestation of another heroic ethos, in the mould of the convict-shepherd, the Irish bushranger - the spirit of the Territory battler? Such a spirit could well help to sustain the outback worker struggling under oppressive northern conditions and even shape the distant view of Territory life from the South. But it would be irresponsible as a reason for repeating disastrous investment and reprehensible as a basis for government decision. Such a popular sentiment was more likely to be mouthed in official quarters to screen a lack of direction; certainly this was the case after the 1895 Royal Commission.

The Adelaide Register commented on 24 July 1895: The remedies recommended for the existing stagnation of the Territory are all as familiar as a twenty-times told tale. Uninspired they may have been, but much of South Australia's expenditure in the Northern Territory after 1895-96 has been attributed to recommendations of the Royal Commission. Sadly, however, the government's eventual actions had little effect on the Territory economy: some help with the cost of providing water on cattle-runs and on the north-south stockroute; an inadequate crushing battery and cyanide plant at new goldfields in the MacDonnell Ranges; an agricultural expert who went north to look at the land at the start of the Wet Season, thereby confirming Adelaide's stubborn ignorance of the northern climate. Nothing new was done for tick-fever eradication.

Legislative changes achieved less: Chinese, the most productive workers, were effectively banned from new goldfields; horse-breeding was encouraged by extravagantly generous leases, to no effect, and mineral rights given away with new pastoral leases, an innovation quickly exploited by speculators with no developmental benefit. It seemed that the government's view of both the Territory's problems and its own options was clouded and incapable of change. Recognition of the urgent needs of pastoralism and mining, the only viable sectors, had not been achieved.

Changing terms of land tenure critically affected the struggling pastoral industry and the government's capacity to assist. The Northern Territory debt to South Australia reached £1,941,243 ($3,882,486) in 1895, and continued to increase. This was mainly due to lower income from land rents, the cumulative effect of the Land Act of 1890 which made agricultural blocks rent-free and put larger selections on easier long and short terms in an experiment hoped to encourage settlement. Later, the Land Act of 1899, in providing for rent-free perpetual leases of up to 1000 acres [405 hectares] if £2 [$4] per acre [1 acre = 0.404 hectare] was spent on meatworks construction within two years, attempted to stimulate and support a beef industry restricted without refrigeration to tallow and salt-beef production. However, no security of tenure was offered, and the acreage specified was too small to be economically viable; no lasting development resulted.

Though not always successful, the South Australian Government saw a need, in its lands policies, to try and prevent speculation (remembering, perhaps, the debacles in Northern Territory land ownership and mining in the 1860s and 70s).
From 1890, all pastoral land was liable to resumption. Compensation for improvements was payable on a scale that was meagre indeed, determined by the unused period of a lease (one quarter of the lease remaining on resumption meant one quarter of compensation payable). This was so detrimental that it was liberalised in the Act of 1899 and again in 1901. But the new conditions were overruled in 1902 by a proposal to complete the transcontinental railway, causing all crown lands to be placed on annual rental permits, so effectively freezing pastoral development. This system remained until the end of the South Australian administration.6

These Land Acts of the 1890s reveal much of South Australian misunderstanding of the conditions under which the Northern Territory pastoral industry suffered. Though these conditions were somewhat reminiscent of their own outback regions, the Territory was far more isolated, with no hope of successfully initiating developmental schemes such as irrigation, which began in South Australia in 1887. Any improvements must have cost far more in transport, time, effort, materials and wages than in the south. To deny security of tenure and adequate compensation in these circumstances was to deter new investment, and therefore new pastoral establishment; the few successful stations were owned by investors big enough financially to survive officialdom.

In addition, there was a desperate shortage of markets for Northern Territory cattle: no local meat market; only a prospect of live trade with Asia; no facilities for meat processing for export; and finally the vast distance cattle had to be driven, either to Port Darwin for shipping, or interstate, arriving at best as low-priced 'stores'. The paucity of good quality land, low prices, losses from Aboriginal attack and from the tick-fever that ravaged mobs within 300 kilometres of the coast and prevented the stocking of stations from the late 1880s, added to the list of natural and imposed deterrents to pastoralism. The wonder is that people kept trying, falling and trying again, perhaps lured on by the survival of the big stations.

This survival was made possible only by the use of Aboriginal labour, usually unpaid, traded for food, tobacco and old clothing. By 1892, most station hands were local Aborigines who, having finally conceded the loss of their land, camped in families near the homestead on which they came to depend. As stockriders they were expert and hard working and cost the station owner an estimated £1 - £2 [$2 - $4] a month compared with the £2 - £4 [$4 - $8] a week European labour demanded. In the remotest parts, the women were 'invaluable', Searcy records:...


Local appreciation of their value to the pastoral industry in ways such as these helped to moderate the repercussions of Aboriginal depredations, of cattle killing and attacks on settlers in the 'back country' (eighteen settlers were killed between 1902 and 1906). It is quite likely that only the value of this co-operation saved the Aborigines of the pastoral regions from far worse treatment at the hands of invading Europeans, and, by the 1890s, the Chinese. The absence of protective legislation showed the government's perception of the Aborigines as of no consequence, in the general tradition of nineteenth-century colonial governments, with no understanding of their considerable importance to Northern Territory pastoralism and certainly no awareness of their agonising predicament in the loss of their land.

The use of a little of this land for market gardens was most successfully achieved by some Chinese, very small economically as individuals, but by 1890 four-fifths of the non-Aboriginal population. On a strictly local scale in carefully chosen and nurtured arable land close to Palmerston, on the Daly River and on the goldfields, these ex-miners grew tropical fruits and vegetables and rice crops that were the mainstay of dietary health for the declining settlements. Ex-mining warden JG Knight, Government Resident with responsibility for the promotion of agriculture, seriously proposed in 1890 the expansion of rice growing by immigrant Chinese farmers along the Adelaide River, an idea never pursued.

From the beginnings in 1863, the official attitude had been one of expectation that 'coloured labour' would be useful in the Northern Territory. JL Parsons, ex-Government Resident, believed it was 'part of the original covenant with the land-order holders that coolies should be brought in'; he favoured importing indentured labour and was certain that suitable agricultural land, with 'coloured labour' and sufficient capital would produce very satisfactorily 8. The government had attempted to recruit labour in India, Mauritius, Hong Kong and, successfully at last, in Singapore. In 1876-77, a semi-official effort was even made, with the Colton ministry's blessing, to populate the Northern Territory with Japanese farmer-settlers, a move disallowed by their government.

Japanese divers were to make a valuable economic contribution in the revival of the pearlshell and pearling industries in Port Darwin in the 1890s. Their success as boat owner-operators moved Premier Kingston, a committed anti-Asian, to allow no further pearling licenses to Asians and, in 1896, to exclude all Asian migrants, an Act which failed to get Royal assent. The number of Japanese divers dropped later under a South Australian Proclamation of 1898, which refused entry to 'any alien not entitled by treaty to enter South Australia'. Kingston was adamant - the Act of 1896 had failed, the 1898 Proclamation was enforceable. One senses here the pressure of the United Labor Party, bitter opponents of immigrant labour and key supporters of the Kingston ministry.

8. SAPP 1895, No. 19, pp64,71.
The Chinese in the Northern Territory had grown in economic productivity in the goldmines by working out difficult seams as tributers to the owner companies. According to Government Resident reports, their numbers in mining dropped slowly from around 2000 in 1894 to 600 by the end of 1910. The drop in gold production over the same period may have been the cause or the effect of this movement, for some into agriculture, for many departure from the Territory. Their total number fell by 2056 after 1895 to 1325 adults and 62 children in 1910. The number of 4048 men and 45 women in 1890 was never approached again in this era. The sharp drop annually from 1899 reflects the impact of Kingston's Proclamation, as Chinese returning home were not replaced.

The government's tighter race legislation in the 1890s reflected attitudes of powerful individuals, the growing Labor movement and changing community perceptions, unfortunately self-defeating. That these were harmful to Territory development can be seen as the regulations bit into productivity in pearlshell, which declined as the Japanese left; in gold, although speculative company policies also contributed; and in unknown losses from schemes needing the skills of Asian labour, proposed but never implemented. Acclimatisation of workers from cool climates - Britain or south-east Australia - must always have been stressful, for some, impossible. North Queenslanders and those from the tropics knew the climate and could come to work in the Territory with some realistic prospect of settling. To ignore this and discourage most of these out of prejudice, with shortage of labour a chronic and critical problem, was an unfortunate perception for the development of the economy in the last years of South Australian control.

The traditional South Australian belief, misconceived from the start, that large-scale agriculture would solve for the Northern Territory all problems of income, settlement, jobs and markets must have derived from certain identifiable sources. These included the success in India of British economic exploitation by plantation agriculture (but there the pre-existing society was already structured and readily exploitable); the seeming success of sugar estates in Queensland (on imported Polynesian labour and by the 1880s already declining); glowing reports of soil fertility by early explorers Leichhardt, Gregory and Stuart, extracted from generally more balanced accounts and well publicised; and the urgings of Northern Territory aficionados, such as MW Holtze, Director of the government's Botanic Garden in Palmerston from the early 1880s until succeeded by his son in 1897, and J Langdon Parsons, whose opinions were made known in forthright fashion.

The acknowledged attachment of South Australians to land ownership derived from the founding philosophy of their colony - the Wakefieldian-based principle of free settlement on rural land sold to finance worker immigration. Belief in the benefits of land productivity, as proven to them in the wheatlands of South Australia, became an article of faith. In the absence of facilities for quick and easy travel and first-hand local knowledge, strongly-held though mistaken notions could thus become
entrenched in southern minds, (although personal experience itself did not always guarantee objectivity - the ‘Sketch of the Northern Territory’ by Government Resident EW Price, 1880, exemplifies biased local assessment).

By offering rewards and subsidised land, the South Australian Government had attempted before 1890 to promote plantations of sugar, coffee, rubber, tobacco and maize crops in the Top End, with no success. Holtze, in optimum conditions at public expense in the Botanic Garden, grew a huge range of experimental crops, the basis for his promotion of agriculture as a viable enterprise, forgetting his large labour force, modern facilities and small-scale operation. Pests, diseases, poor soils and the climate devastated introduced crops (and still do). Holtze’s paper in 1901 for the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia, South Australian Branch, illustrates the misleading propaganda possible from an ‘expert’ with misperceived beliefs. He quotes secondhand descriptions of Northern Territory river flats as being rich in productive potential - these are known to lack potash, to be awash for five months of the year, and in addition are populated with crocodiles. But for Holtze it was a Garden of Eden going to waste for lack of good cheap labour (he appreciated his Chinese gardeners), invested capital and ‘intelligent management’.

Such propaganda fostered South Australian expectations. What is remarkable is the persisting faith of experienced Territorians in these fallacious ideas. VL Solomon was the first MLA for the Northern Territory, from 1890 until his election to the first Federal Parliament in 1901, and later between 1905 and 1908; he owned Palmerston’s weekly newspaper in the late 1880s, was a member of the Constitutional Convention in 1897-98, had seventeen years residence and extensive mining interests in the Territory. In spite of this, he still held a strong belief in its sugar-growing potential, despite admitting in lengthy evidence to the 1895 Royal Commission that ‘planters in the Territory have many difficulties - white ants, grubs, rats... heavy floods’. J Langdon Parsons, MLC, Baptist minister, Minister responsible for the Northern Territory from 1881-84, Government Resident from 1884 to 1890, then MLA for the Territory until 1893, had supreme faith in its agricultural potential, if well-managed. His evidence to the Royal Commission blames the Delissaville sugar disaster of 1881-82 on the lack of investment and development of that industry. A much-publicised plantation yielded virtually nothing because, he asserted, it was set up on unsuitable land. As a result of this failure no-one would then venture further. He denied that Northern Territory land was ‘more patchy’ than that used for sugarcane in Queensland and blamed badly chosen land for the failure of Northern Territory agriculture in general. His broad view on the subject was expressed to the Commission when he quoted:

The importance of agriculture is obvious... as the parent of manufactures and commerce. Without agriculture there can be neither civilization nor population.

Perhaps his faith was founded in the hope for the Territory to become civilised as well as settled!
Having over-extended its resources in first demanding the Territory in 1863, South Australia had to recoup where it could or concede defeat, which Parsons saw as 'a damage to our reputation'. The government made first claim on any Territory earnings, to the mid-nineties derived mainly from the export of gold. By now the mining scene had settled down from its hectic and disastrously speculative beginnings in the 1870s, fuelled then by a swift passage of misinformation to Adelaide along the new Overland Telegraph Line from Palmerston. The boom and collapse had left a residue of mainly English companies with a workforce of mostly Chinese tributers, first recruited in Singapore in 1874 by government agents to provide cheap labour. From the 1880s, unsuccessful small gold prospectors drifted into a search for new metals: copper, silver, lead, tin and wolfram.

A project aimed to assist mining expansion and development was the building of a railway south from Palmerston to the Pine Creek goldfields. But by the time it was finished, in 1889, it was far too late for this purpose and as a stimulus to pastoral settlement was an expensive example of mistaken perception. A railway could serve very few pastoral stations when each needed a vast acreage for viability; and most movement of stock had to be to markets east and west, not in a north or south direction.

Gold production peaked in 1892, after which it declined as other metals slowly took over. The mining industry earned most of the Territory's limited income until 1901, when pastoral products and pearlshell combined to overtake it. The minerals that had promised so much, especially gold, on which Victoria in particular had been transformed, proved disappointingly elusive. The government's introduction of Chinese mineworkers had been vindicated by production figures, particularly during the nineties. But changing community attitudes and federation policies were now crippling this one realistic government initiative.

Through the 1890s, South Australian authorities grew more frustrated, despairing of ever finding an approach that would unlock the Territory's economic promise. Their collective misperceptions, as shown by their legislative decisions in the key areas of mining, pastoralism and pearling, were that the Territory should be able to develop on European labour, temporary land tenure, crude mining techniques, two hundred and thirty kilometres of costly railway line and inadequate permanent water, stock routes and cattle markets. Their faith in an agricultural solution persisted.

In exasperation with his colleagues, Northern Territory MLA Griffiths, in a plaintive speech of some length in July 1895, claimed that 'the main interests of the Territory were simply ignored', rejected the Royal Commission 'because it was not their intention to visit the Territory' and pleaded for action 'to cope with the redwater disease', which he saw as the single worst barrier to pastoral viability. He complained of the apathy of the House and begged Treasurer Holder, the responsible Minister, to visit the north. Through these records there is an ominous feeling that the decision makers were calmly oblivious to the reality of conditions in the Territory, with Holder declaring in 1896 that:

9. SAPD (LA) 1895, pp654-5.
no-one could administer the affairs of the Northern Territory as long as he had without...becoming acquainted pretty well in detail with the many phases of Northern Territory affairs. ¹⁰

He was Minister responsible briefly in 1892 and from 1894 to 1899, but never went north of the Centre; his complacency indicated satisfaction with this situation.

Solutions proposed in the House ranged widely, as they will when a problem and its causes are misunderstood. There were advocates for completion of the transcontinental railway between Oodnadatta and Pine Creek, by both the land-grant system and the Government at a cost, Griffiths estimated, of some ten million pounds [£20m]. Government-assisted deep mining of less accessible gold reefs was recommended, and there were all the suggestions and recommendations from the Northern Territory Royal Commission, which included the completion of the Oodnadatta-Pine Creek railway.

Like agriculture, the north–south transcontinental rail-line had become a traditional 'salvation', the solution in many minds to Northern Territory problems of productivity and settlement. It seemed also to promise Adelaide a direct link with the world through 'speedy communication with Europe'. This notion, like the possession of the Territory, fostered 'unsubstantial sentimental dreams of greatness', delusions that would not die. Economically, it promised crippling debt, £350 000 pounds [$700 000] per annum in interest alone if built with public money. A private enterprise method used in North America was being promoted, the 'land-grant' system, whereby land along the route in alternating square miles [1 square mile = 2.59 sq km] on either side of the line would be given to the construction company as payment, obviously possible only when empty Crown land was virtually unlimited and even then fraught with risk. JL Parsons estimated this would total 50-80 million acres [20 235 000 to 32 376 000 hectares] for the 1800 kilometres of the Oodnadatta-Pine Creek connection (all to come from the Northern Territory). Development of this land to pay for the railway 'would be the business of the [successful] syndicate...that class of people are well able to look after themselves', he stated. Initially a route directly north was favoured, later modified to deviate towards the Queensland border 'to pick up the NSW and Queensland trade'. The line was to be handed over to the South Australian Government five years after completion.

From 1880 the land-grant railway, as this proposal came to be called, had attracted a dedicated following more-or-less actively pursuing this goal. Espousing the cause in the Parliament was Simpson Newland, retired NSW squatter, South Australian MLA and later President of the South Australian Branch of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia. In 1886, in the depths of an economic recession which postponed decisions, he had chaired a Committee which travelled north

¹¹.Robert Barr Smith, A Protest against...Land Grant Railways, Adelaide,1907, p7.
'traversing the MacDonnell Ranges, and reported favourable on the construction of a line on the land-grant system'. VL Solomon later told the 1895 Royal Commission that this was 'the opinion of nearly the whole of the electors in the Territory' and it was one of the Commission's recommendations. But in 1897 'the Government...was not prepared...to recommend to Parliament to sanction the construction of any Transcontinental Railway on the land grant or guarantee system'.

Strong opposition in some business circles agreed, expressing the view that

a long railway through an uninhabited country, which is not a world highway between large centres of population, can never be the salvation of a State.

The idea that the Northern Territory be disposed of had already surfaced. After a visit in 1888, JCF Johnston, Minister responsible in the Playford government, had reacted thus:

It is a bad job that we have had anything to do with the Territory - a bad thing for South Australia and a bad thing for the Territory. We should get rid of it.

This general idea was an occasional theme in parliamentary debates; Treasurer Holder in 1896 outlined a plan whereby the Northern Territory could be sold 'on short notice [for] a much larger sum than they were liable for to a Chartered Company... got up in London to take it over' - in other words, they could make money out of it! This was to reassure members anxious about the growing debt and asking 'what had we to show for our money?' Holder had just denied that South Australia would have to bear any Northern Territory debts because the accounts were kept separately and South Australia was only the guarantor, a debatable legal point; so the reality of his proposal is hard to assess.

In 1897 Premier Kingston told the House that they could see the approach of federation and it might be that at no distant date another greater authority would be asked to assume to itself the control of the Northern Territory, and relieve South Australia of what was undoubtedly a great burden.

This was the latest in a range of options that had been aired. Evidence to the Royal Commission from JCF Johnston, MP had recommended keeping the MacDonnell Ranges to the 23rd parallel and giving the rest back to Britain, despite his belief that it would become 'a very rich mineral country'. Typically, JL Parsons had offered six ways for South Australia to 'get free from the Northern Territory liability': for the Imperial Government to resume the Territory; for South Australia to obtain permanent ownership to the 21st parallel; to sell part of the Territory to Queensland; to create 'a large trading company' in order to hand it all over to private enterprise; to take on Victoria and NSW as joint venturers in Northern Territory sugar production; or to dispose of the Northern Territory to 'one of the Australian colonies or a joint stock company'. But he advised

12. SAPP 1895, No. 67.
that only bankruptcy should cause the colony to approach the Imperial Government [because] it would damage their reputation' - clearly more than economics was at stake.

In evidence to the 1895 Commission, VL Solomon said he 'would sooner see it shut up for twenty-five years than give it back'; he feared that, because of international treaties, Britain could not 'restrict the influx of Asiatic people', that it might hand over the Territory to a trading company, which 'would not scruple to introduce any kind of Asiatic labour', or revert the Territory to Crown Colony status, 'unwise' for Australia as all states had now achieved autonomy. Ideas ranged from the impracticable to the negative; but steadily the hope built in government minds that relief would come with federation, which undoubtedly lulled any real sense of urgency to pursue Territory solutions.

Strangely (from a Territory viewpoint), the surrendering of the Northern Territory did not loom largely amongst the issues during the 1898 campaign in South Australia on the Federation Bill. Regional economic problems were clearly more urgent and South Australian self-interest in matters of interstate rivalry dominated the campaign. The Murray River trade; 'cut-throat railway rates' affecting Kingston as 'the natural outlet' for Victoria's wheatlands; the Broken Hill trade, closed off by tariff barriers; and Port Augusta as 'the port for a very large part of Queensland', also closed off, were all aired as the prospective issues in 1897 by Treasurer Holder. Release from the burden of the Northern Territory was mentioned only as helping to offset the new expense of the federal administration. It is possible that within the electors of South Australia there still lurked some pride in the 'possession' of the Territory, which the 'pro-Billites' had to respect. More likely, this issue was of minor interest to the urban majority in South Australia.

Support for the Bill was loud and clear in the Northern Territory. The Northern Territory Times raised the side issue of national defence, 'lest a speculative freebooter might drop in here and rob us of every penny'; but, revealing its central conviction, editorials most strongly urged the 'Yes' vote because Under a United Australia the Territory must obtain those many adjuncts to advancement which South Australia has denied her. There can be no two questions as to the effect of Australian unity upon the Territory...our advice to voters is to...muster in force at the poll on Saturday with a friendly 'aye'.

Muster in force they did not; only one quarter of the electorate turned up, as might be expected from a tiny far-flung community. But those who did attend voted overwhelmingly for federation, by 148 votes to 14. The Bill won in South Australia, but not nationally. A second referendum in 1899 was more successful and now it was time for changing expectations for the Territory's future to be realised.

Some curious beliefs surfaced in this period. In June 1898, Holder and King O'Malley spoke of an offer from a syndicate to
pay all the Territory's debt if they could develop it with 'coloured labour', which could be used to pressure the Commonwealth if it refused to take over the Territory - a strange understanding of the residual powers of the newly federated South Australia in the area of immigration. Norris demonstrates that 'a White Australia and the campaign on the Bill were not generally related' in South Australia, not even in a Northern Territory concerned about Chinese competition. The federated condition, it must be remembered, was beyond the experience of most Australian colonials. This new system of divided powers had yet to be grasped by state governments, each by now used to full autonomy. Given their rivalry and mutual mistrust, achievement of Federation had been, as Deakin put it, 'a series of miracles'.

In a major speech in 1899, FW Holder, still South Australian Treasurer and Minister for the Northern Territory, outlined the history of the Northern Territory relationship, pointing out its temporary nature due to the Imperial Government's opposition to permanent annexation in 1863 and again when approached in 1882, and therefore the separate financial account and absence of South Australian liability. The Territory then owed £1 663 930 [$3 327 860] to bondholders and $653 459 [$1 306 918] to South Australia, he said.

The Federal Parliament would take it over under a clause (No. 111) inserted in the Constitution to 'provide for the taking over and government of the Territory', moved by Mr VL Solomon during the 1897-98 Constitutional Convention. Should this not occur, Holder said, the South Australian Government had only to start negotiations with 'capitalists' who would pay the Northern Territory debt and bring in 'Hindoos, who were not aliens' and 'the Federation, to protect the other colonies, would be bound to take over the Territory'. He concluded by reviewing each sector of the Territory economy, all except pearlshelling now at a low ebb; and he voiced his opposition to a land-grant railway, fearing it would attract undercapitalised speculators who could use such a contract to raise finance in the London money market for other ventures and leave the Territory stranded.

A similar view from successful businessman and philanthropist, Robert Barr Smith, was put more graphically: Give us this land-grant railway, and both South Australia and the Territory will become the tail of a dog which barks and bites at us from London.

The ghost of past speculation by now haunted all economic thinking regarding the Northern Territory. This legacy from ill-judged policies in the first decade proved thereafter to be an effective constraint on objective assessment and planning, based on the realities of the problems faced.

Heading the new ministry formed in late 1899, Premier Holder opened negotiations with Prime Minister Barton on 18 April 1901, speedily offering the Northern Territory to the new

18. SAPD 1899, p848.
Commonwealth, without parliamentary sanction. He pointed out that

had South Australia been willing to have given carte blanche to capitalists to introduce coloured labour into the Territory, a sum of money estimated at about ten millions sterling would have been forthcoming to establish a chartered company to take over the Territory...[its] assets and liabilities...and construction...of the railway. This offer was declined...in South Australia's interests and in the interests of Australia.20

Holder’s offer was acknowledged on 25 April 1901 and was followed up in the Federal Parliament by VL Solomon, now MHR for South Australia, with a motion on 5 July that the House ‘at once enter into negotiations’. This elicited some revealing opinions and attitudes from House members. In stark contrast to South Australia’s unrealistic expectations, feelings elsewhere were extremely disillusioned: the high Northern Territory level of Asian population was suspect; the economic failure of every enterprise was well known and the region was generally viewed with distaste. In the words of MHR Ewing, member for Richmond, NSW:

There is simply nothing to keep body and soul together - no food for cattle or sheep. The whole country is a howling wilderness, and will remain so for all of time.

Of the tropical north:

such an amount of malaria [exists] that a white man finds it hard to live there...The town [of Palmerston]...is periodically blown into the sea.

Of the Territorians:

[The population] consists of a few whites, a considerable number of Japanese, a good number of Chinese, a considerable number of Aborigines, and a considerable number of criminals...

and while Solomon’s motives were not questioned, ‘the whole of his local information appears...incorrect’. Ewing slated the South Australians’ self-esteem by concluding:

Could any place be more useless from the local stand-point?...But [as] the back door to Asia it must be taken over...by the Commonwealth...for national reasons and not for local reasons. 21

In this he clearly expressed the view of the vast majority of members before the debate was adjourned. Strangely, however, nothing more was heard from the South Australians.

Under Holder’s successor, Premier Jenkins, preparations had begun on a firm proposal to the Commonwealth. Finally on 21 August 1902, a motion proposed by JL Parsons, MLC, was passed. Its extravagant terms included full compensation for South Australia’s expenses, extension of South Australia’s border 500 kilometres north to the 21°S parallel (to keep new goldmines), and completion of the transcontinental railway link, within a fixed period to be negotiated. In admitting defeat, the South Australian Government was determined to emerge a winner.

20. SAPP 1901, No. 27, pp1-2.
21. CPD (HR), 5.7.1901, pp2149-2156.
At once consternation broke out among the optimists, the traditionalists, and the capitalist pastoral interests of South Australia at the prospective loss of their opportunity for vindication and the perceived threat of Commonwealth control. In a successful last-ditch stand, lobby groups pressured the South Australian Government through the Legislative Council and throughout the 1902 State election campaign. Using the railway issue, they were successful in delaying the eventual surrender of the Territory to the Commonwealth. In the resultant Act, the railway was to be built and would be financed by land-grants. The railway was perceived as a means of shoring up the shaky status of Adelaide, threatened now by other states' railway plans and new telegraphic systems with becoming a backwater.

This volte-face, occurring between the state election and the passing of this Act in October, caused VL Solomon considerable embarrassment on the resumption of debate in the Federal Parliament on his July motion. A mining investor with a Territory viewpoint, he nevertheless saw the South Australian terms of transfer as so 'absurd and inequitable' that he attempted to withdraw the motion. He suspected the Land-grant Railway Act was imminent, as did his irritated colleagues; as Labor's JC Watson, member for Bland, put it:

South Australia seem[s] anxious to keep control of the Northern Territory until they have put their little private-enterprise schemes through...from the national point of view, an incubus...[if] in active operation.

The debate wrangled on until Alfred Deakin, Federal Attorney-General, brought his moderating influence and consistently national viewpoint to an explanation of the government's position. By controlling immigration, he said, the Commonwealth already controlled the potential to operate profitably of any company attracted by the land-grant scheme: as well, it could impose 'any conditions it may think fit' on existing 'aliens'. The Commonwealth in fact 'were owners in a special sense of all the northern coasts of Australia'; therefore it should assume responsibility for 'the triple problems involved - the tropical, the racial and the financial' - and also, he believed, for the great numbers of Aborigines in these parts, in the interests of their 'better treatment'. Deakin's clear logic seems simple and obvious; but it relied on an Australian viewpoint not yet developed in the parochial South Australians, who when it came to the Northern Territory, were too closely involved with their aspirations, hopes and frustrating economic failures to be able to take the long view. Deakin had always been outside the situation and had, in his own words, 'lived a life of devotion...day to day' to the federal cause, so was imbued with the national perspective.

However, he had to point out the obstacles to any rapid takeover of the Northern Territory:

the book-keeping sections of the Constitution [section 87] under which for the next five or ten years our hands are tied...Any State...has far greater freedom...for that period

22. SAPD (LA), 29.10.1902, p837.
23. CPD (HR), 10.9.1902, pp15898-911.
than the Commonwealth.

To fund such a takeover would have required the raising of 'four times the amount by means of customs and excise, or the early introduction of direct taxation'; the Commonwealth was constitutionally forbidden this choice at present. The transfer was inevitable, he said, both morally and nationally, and should happen as soon as possible but 'financial and other obligations' could not be ignored.

In an impressively productive conclusion after an unpromising start, it was resolved:

That in the opinion of this House, it is advisable that the complete control and jurisdiction over the Northern Territory of South Australia be acquired by the Commonwealth upon just terms (the Deakin amendment). 26

In this he clearly expressed the view of the vast majority.

Three years went by while the groups comprising the Landgrant Railway League unsuccessfully pursued large investors. Simpson Newland's pamphlet of 1902 attempts to justify the South Australian Railway Act in all the old extravagant terms, claiming the Northern Territory to be 'capable of supplying a vast population'. But both this publication, the Act itself and the movement failed to attract tenders despite Adelaide Chamber of Commerce support, which was derided by Barr Smith thus: 'See with what light hearts and how little regret these gentlemen give away a freehold equal to four kingdoms.' 28 To investors the risks were clearly too great for the huge outlay involved.

In 1905 the Liberal government in South Australia was replaced by its first elected Labor government, headed by Tom Price and supported by AH Peak's group of small farmer-Liberals (the Price-Peake ministry, the thirty-second to be in charge of Northern Territory development in 42 years). In February 1906, Premier Tom Price reopened negotiations, this time with Alfred Deakin, now Prime Minister of Australia.

Deakin did not have a high opinion of South Australian clear-sightedness, describing the State's attitude as 'belligerent, provincial, ambitious'. He was negotiating from a position of strength. Because of section 87 of the Constitution, he was unable to move quickly. The South Australians' alternative i.e. the land-grant rail scheme, having collapsed, they were now the more eager to come to terms with the Commonwealth, and the new Labor Premier shared to an extent Deakin's ideological commitment. By February 1907, the two parties had hammered out an agreement by which the Commonwealth would compensate South Australia for the Overland Telegraph and the Port Augusta-Oodnadatta railway, and also assume responsibility

26. CPD (HR), 10.9.1902, p15911.
27. S Newland, Land Grant Railway Across Central Australia, Adelaide, 1902, p5.
for South Australian indebtedness in respect of the Northern Territory. The Commonwealth also pledged itself to the building, at some unspecified date in the future, of a transcontinental railway. The Commonwealth thereby acquired the Territory with its improvements, the Port Augusta–Oodnadatta line and the right to build, on routes of its own choosing, railways across South Australia (notably to Western Australia, a Commonwealth referendum promise thwarted so far by South Australia). South Australian editorial comment on the Memorandum setting out these terms was critical and sceptical and believed it amounted to 'surrender and scuttle' policy.30

At the Brisbane Premiers' Conference in May 1907, Premier Tom Price distanced South Australia as merely the 'manager' of the Northern Territory; by then the Territory seemed clearly headed for Commonwealth control, once the transfer agreement had passed both Parliaments. In Brisbane, New South Wales had brought up the matter of the agreement, its wider financial impact and effect on the planning of railways. The Conference record discloses how state leaders were wrestling with the federal concept and saw the Commonwealth now in adversarial terms, their traditional rivalries merging into solidarity in the face of future uncertainty of the division of power. But the Premiers were clearly riled by the compensation to South Australia and the likely future cost of the Territory to the Commonwealth, which they perceived as damaging them in the short term. When Price fell back on the issue of settler occupation to defend Australia's north and the need for a railway in those interests, NJ Moore inquired tartly, 'To enable the enemy to come south?' This resentment was confirmed when New South Wales' motion against the proposed agreement 'so far as it affects prejudicially the financial relations of the Commonwealth and States' was passed, Western Australia, Tasmania and New South Wales voting for, Victoria and Queensland abstaining and South Australia voting alone in self-defence.

The Terms of Agreement were tabled in the South Australian Parliament on 27 June 1907. In preparing the Bill for a Surrender Act in January 1908, the Legislative Council, its balance of power held by six northern district pastoralists with Territory interests, slipped an amendment into the Agreement, protecting every 'right in respect of land' in existence at the time. Deakin was then faced with a fait accompli, an Act which he assessed as 'imposing...limitation on the sovereign powers of the Parliament' and therefore as objectionable. Soon after, changes made in regard to Commonwealth autonomy over railways, already agreed to, were disputed. At the subsequent Melbourne conference of Attorneys-General, South Australia agreed to pass an amending Bill to their Act when the Federal Acceptance Bill had been passed, so throwing the onus back on the Commonwealth. Meanwhile the 'objectionable' South Australian Surrender Bill had received Royal assent.

The Commonwealth Acceptance Bill was prepared by October 1908, but long delays followed. Political upheaval

30. Adelaide Observer, 2.3.1907; Adelaide Register, 4.3.1907, 6.3.1907.
changed the Commonwealth leadership twice and Tom Price's death in office caused a constitutional crisis in Adelaide. On resumption in October 1909, at the Second Reading debate on the Acceptance Bill, the restored Deakin, in a landmark speech, showed that with the Territory's problems and with considerations of national development, defence and a 'white Australia' at stake, the Commonwealth had no choice. 'To me', he said, 'the question has not been so much commercial as national...We could put a garrison in there as watchdogs...but [what] we need is not idlers, but workers...The money...is being invested for a national purpose, which will richly repay the investors.' 31 His persuasive assessment made a reasoned approach possible in the ensuing debate, although the member for Wentworth described the Bill as 'a great wrong attempted on the innocent electors of Australia'.

Although passing the House of Representatives, the Bill was held up by New South Wales and Queensland in the Senate on the question of railway routes, and lapsed.

After the 1910 election of Labor governments under Premier Verran and Prime Minister Fisher, the Territory transfer appeared assured; both governments had safe majorities and an ideological commitment to federal control. The ten years of constitutional restriction on Commonwealth spending were also almost over. But as the Bill was being passed in October through both federal Houses in Melbourne, a contretemps bearing all the signs of well-organised disruption hit the South Australian Parliament. From rural areas petitions deluged the Legislative Council, where a motion to 'repeal the Surrender Act' was debated and carried; and in the Assembly, the member for Wooroorah, FW Young, moved 'that South Australian interests were not sufficiently protected' in the Agreement. In retaliation, Verran's Minister for the Northern Territory, WJ Denny, promised the members heavy taxation if the transfer was defeated. Finally, the passing of the Commonwealth Acceptance Bill in November and ominous signs of a German-Japanese military alliance completed the rout.

Taking the Council's Repeal Bill with it, the Young motion quietly died, 23 votes to 9.

On 10 November 1910, WJ Denny introduced for the last time in the Legislative Assembly the subject of the Northern Territory estimates. He gladly quoted an assurance from the Acting Prime Minister, WM Hughes, that 'no time would be lost in starting the great work', beginning with the Western Australian railway. An air of jovial self-satisfaction, tinged with nostalgia, permeated the debate. The Northern Territory members were farewelled with regret and accolades, the Territory losing all rights to democratic representation with the transfer. Persisting still was the belief that 'they were selling it for the debt upon it, when they could have got some advantage', a truly remarkable perception of the speaker, JG Moseley, the member for Port Augusta, who also claimed:

The men who had wanted to keep the Territory for South Australia were nearly all the moneyed men of the State, who knew it meant good business.

The only question was - and still is - when?

The Northern Territory - South Australian 'White Elephant'/Commonwealth Prize

For to the north there lies a land

A great grey chaos, a land half made
Where endless space is, and no life stirreth.
In the great lone land, by the grey Gulf water.

AB Paterson

In the search for historical explanations of the long disappointment that was South Australia's Northern Territory, reality can be as elusive as the Commonwealth later found the right decisions to be. Through all the haze of words clouding objectivity, voicing misperceptions born of traditional belief, ambitious greed and mindless optimism, certain truths can be discerned:

- The solution for South Australia's 'white elephant' had to be, in the end, political; the delay resulted from the political implementation of reasons perceived mostly as economic.
- Private sector interest in the Territory, always governed by economic conditions elsewhere, fed on the hope of emulating the success of a few established cattle stations and mining operations and of a breakthrough in agriculture.
- Government expectations had fallen by the mid-1890s and action dwindled to a holding operation as the hope of a federal takeover grew.
- Opposition to the Northern Territory transfer came from competitive interests interstate; South Australian pastoral interests under perceived threat; traditionalist believers in the transcontinental railway solution; and South Australians who saw the federal compensation as inadequate.

It is worth examining these propositions, with particular reference to the significance of economic perception.

Relief from the burden of the Northern Territory without serious loss of face became likely for South Australia only with the achievement of federation. Federalist Alfred Deakin's long-term vision of an Australian nation included a Northern Territory under Commonwealth control, in the national interests of social and economic development and defence. Deakin was always aware of the constitutional constraint on Commonwealth spending until 1911, which Price, for instance, did not seem to appreciate as he tried to speed the essential Acts through to defeat local opposition.

The political struggle between governments therefore was not over goals but over terms, and here railways were a key issue. To quieten its opposition within, Deakin allowed South Australia to gain a generous, though not extravagant, financial settlement. The Commonwealth thereby achieved major national objectives of rail-building rights through South Australia on routes and at times of its choosing, as well as control over the Northern Territory. Thus, by using the enforced period of delay to outmanoeuvre opposition with single-minded skill, Deakin won two victories for Australia.

In a region where survival was success, the few successful Territory pastoral and mining operations might have encouraged faith in the Northern Territory's future in these areas. What may not have been perceived was that these ventures had to be financed strongly enough so as to survive despite every adversity, including government decisions. Here, phobic fear of speculative investment, of the 'yellow peril', of inadvertently assisting neighbouring states, of debt out of control, and then hope of relief, so affected South Australian judgment and official action that vital state infrastructure was denied these key industries, discouraging expansion.

Meanwhile an historical fixation on the agricultural solution was fostered by the influence of 'experts' and wasted precious state resources. Government initiatives to stimulate private agricultural investment derived, as Powell asserts, from South Australians' stubborn 'faith in their [agrarian] economic system and their blindness to the conditions which made it unsuitable for the north'. Their perception was confused by this belief and the enormities of size and distance that precluded first-hand knowledge.

With federation accomplished and reprieve in sight, the Territory became perceived as 'saleable', as a possible source of profit either from the Commonwealth or a 'chartered company'; the freehold of its empty vastness was regarded by the railway adherents as a means of securing for Adelaide eminence and economic status. Newland's praise of the Northern Territory as a 'splendid gift' to South Australia, while he opposed the Commonwealth transfer in order to trade a large portion of it to foreigners for the railway, was not widely viewed as incongruous; but this epitomises the degree of confused perception in South Australian minds at the time.

The key to such entrenched and widespread misperception lies in self-image, the ethos grown in the South Australian community from its Wakefieldian origins, unique in Australia; from its early success as a non-penal agrarian economy; from its rapid urban growth and the social mores of civilised lifestyle and a certain smugness developed thereby. This intensity of urbanisation made its leaders incapable of grasping the differences of Territory conditions from the beginning, from the time when they first laid claim to this huge land in 'a foolish anxiety to show that, although a small community [they]...were capable of big things'. Those South Australians who did think about it perceived the annexed Territory as a vast country estate; they clung to every opinion supportive of this concept and rejected all evidence to the contrary. After all, their own land, not dissimilar in parts, was living proof of the rewards of hard work and the protestant work ethic of their founders. Why should these not succeed elsewhere?

But, sadly, their 'proven' system was being imposed on a land unimaginably different. That land has since defied the best efforts of science and technology in every twentieth-century

34. Robert Barr Smith, A Protest against ... Land Grant Railways, Adelaide 1907, p2.
agricultural venture; much pastoral land is so marginal that it has to be occupied rent-free to be viable today and the mining industry depends on technical advances made since the 1950s. So what chance did the South Australians have? What else could they have done?

From the viewpoint of hindsight, the outcome would have been better in mining had essential deep-reef shafts been subsidised, and Palmerston and permanent mining towns encouraged by support for Chinese in local agriculture. The pastoral need for permanent water on stations and useful stock-routes, for tick-fever eradication, for security of tenure, for meatworks and negotiated markets warranted government action, which could have been well rewarded. South Australia should have been content with self-sufficiency for the Territory and not crushed it with the debt of the Pine Creek railway in perceived long-term self-interest.

But such decisions were made by politicians, who in South Australia were constantly expending energy in a perpetual factional struggle to stay in power, amidst that turbulent 'mixture of personal, group and institutional influences that constitutes the political process' and determines consensus and quality of judgment.35 In that sense, the Northern Territory of South Australia can be seen as a victim of democracy, of pragmatic leaders relying on 'accepted wisdom', who later, in both Parliaments, opposed the transfer in perceived parochial self-interest.

Asking in 1988, 'What shall we do with the Northern Territory?', Anthony Turner concludes that, with 'mining, land rights, railways and 15 000 bureaucrats', the social, political and financial problems associated with attempted change are insurmountable; not the least of these is 'the national myth factor'.36 So it seems that, for the Territory, mythical belief, or misperception, has become integrated into its prospects for all time and that 'Banjo' Paterson was correctly predicting its future when he wrote in The Bulletin:

*Some day it may be civilised and spoilt, but up to the present it has triumphantly overthrown all who have tried to improve it. It is still the Territory.*

35. RS Parker in JJ Eastwood & FB Smith (eds), *Historical Studies*, Australia and New Zealand, First Series, Carlton, 1974, p175.
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